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VOLUME IV

**ARMY READINESS AND
MOBILIZATION REGION CONCEPT**

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <i>Four Volume Report: I - Executive Summary and main body of final report -- findings, conclusions, and recommendations (374 pgs); II - Detailed description of existing command and control organizational structure in COMUS and the can- didate alternative organizations (502 pgs); III - Annexes supporting Vol I -- background leading to the study, methodology, 19 supporting sub-studies, minutes of meetings of advisory groups, selected bibliography, glossary (546 pgs); IV - Detailed description of Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARNR) concept (66 pgs). (See Continuation Page)</i>		

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Item 20, "Abstract," Continued

Study conducted in Office of Chief of Staff, Army, by 18-man study group led by BG (P) Dwight L. Wilson (names of other members listed in Executive Summary). Study objective was to make recommendations to the Chief of Staff, Army, to improve Total Army CONUS command and control capabilities to perform missions during peacetime, wartime, and throughout the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

Methodology included research of literature; data collection; interviews with staff members of all Services, within OSD, with key staff members and commanders (past and present) of CONUS major commands, and at 146 Active and Reserve Component headquarters from MACOM through battalion levels; documentation of organization, responsibilities, procedures, and resources for existing CONUS command and control structure from HQDA through brigade levels; development of candidate organizational structure alternatives; quantitative and qualitative analysis of the existing structure and alternatives; Army Staff and MACOM review of, and comment concerning, the study group's findings, conclusions, and recommendations; and, presentation of the final report to the Army's leadership.

Study report provides recommendations concerning 61 specific issues identified by the group as requiring resolution in order to accomplish the study objective (Vol I, Chap 7). Recommendations are organized in three general categories:

1 - Organizational: this includes layering, installation management, spans of control, peacetime functional alignment of MACOM and selected Reserve Component units, etc..

2 - Transition (from peacetime to wartime operations): this includes use of State Area Commands (STARCs), adequacy of communications and ADP support, adequacy of dedicated planning resources, requirements for mobilization exercises, etc..

3 - Other: this includes feasibility of providing "one-stop" installation support for Reserve Component units, potential use of recent retirees in selected Reserve Component units, adequacy of post-mobilization individual training programs, planning for total mobilization, etc..



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

17 APR 1980

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) -- Final Report
(Volumes I - IV)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. Subject study has been reviewed at HQDA.
2. The recommendations of the study group, contained in Chapter 7 of Volume I, have been approved with the following modifications:
 - a. Organizational Issue 1. The Army Readiness and Mobilization Region concept, described in Volume IV, is the approved organizational alternative.
 - b. Organizational Issue 3. The activation of one additional CONUS headquarters is contingent upon the availability of resources; resource availability will be addressed during the staffing of the Army FY 82-86 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
 - c. Organizational Issue 17. Battalion-level advisory positions may be retained on a case-by-case basis if justified by a FORSCOM review conducted in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve.
 - d. Organizational Issue 20. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, is assigned the responsibility for developing the Army Mobilization and Planning System (AMPS). The Director for the Army Staff has the authority to approve the organizational requirements to support development of the AMPS.

THOMAS U. GREER
Major General, GS
Director of Management

ARMY COMMAND

AND CONTROL STUDY-82

(ACCS-82)

VOLUME IV

Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR)

Concept

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FOREWORD

The views, opinions, findings and/or recommendations contained herein should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.

This volume contains backup information to be considered in conjunction with Volumes I-III, Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82). The materials in these volumes are specific to the needs of the study and should not be extracted out of context.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME IV: Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) Concept

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD.....	i
Table of Contents.....	ii
Introduction.....	1
Executive Summary.....	2
Detailed Description.....	6
Narrative Description.....	6
Command Relationships and Responsibility for Area and Subordinate Elements.....	8
Functions and Responsibilities.....	10
Staffing Concept.....	13
Stationing.....	15
Effects on Management Systems.....	16
Resource Summary.....	19
Comparison With the Base Case.....	21
Development and Testing.....	22
Inclosures.	
1 Summary of Command Relationships.....	1-1
2 HQDA Mobilization Planning Role.....	2-1
3 Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON or Command Over Functional RC Units.....	3-1
4 Mobilization Planners - Assignment by Installation.....	4-1
5 Post-mobilization Assignment of ARCOM to Command Mobilization Stations.....	5-1
6 CONUSA TDA (Published Separately).....	6-1

7	Manpower for Recommended Added Corps HHC Organization.....	7-1
8	AC COSCOM Detachment.....	8-1
9	Corps Field Artillery Section (FAS).....	9-1
10	Proposed Organization of Corps Signal Brigade.....	10-1
11	Candidate Stations for Added AC Corps HQ.....	11-1
	List of Figures.....	iv
	List of Tables.....	v

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Page</u>
1 Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) Concept.....	3
2 Command Relationship-FORSCOM and Major Deployable AC Organizations.....	9
10-1 Proposed Organization of Corps Signal Brigade.....	10-1
10-2 Corps Command Operations Battalion.....	10-3
10-3 Corps Radio Battalion.....	10-5

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1 Responsibility for Dedicated Mobilization Planners.....	13
2 Headquarters Computers and Monthly Cost.....	17
3 ADPE Costs.....	18
2-1 AMPS Staffing Requirements.....	2-2
4-1 Mobilization Planners - Assignment by Installations.....	4-1 & 4-2
5-1 Post-mobilization Assignment of ARCOM to Command Mobilization Stations.....	5-1
7-1 Manpower For Recommended Added Corps HHC Organization.....	7-1
8-1 AC COSCOM Detachment.....	8-1
9-1 Corps Field Artillery Section (FAS).....	9-1
11-11 Candidate Stations for Added AC Corps.....	11-1

INTRODUCTION

Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) recommendations were presented to the Army Staff (ARSTAF) Select Committee (SELCOM) on 24 August 1979. At that time, the VCSA approved ACCS-82 recommendations that did not involve selection of an organizational alternative. The VCSA also directed that FORSCOM develop a test plan to examine the concepts of ACCS-82 Alternative 3A.

From August to November FORSCOM personnel developed the test plan for Alternative 3A. During this period, they concluded that the turbulence that would be caused by implementing Alternative 3A made the alternative unworkable. Therefore, FORSCOM developed another alternative structure which made only minor changes to the current structure but also addressed identified mobilization planning and execution problems.

At a briefing for the VCSA on 15 November 1979, FORSCOM presented both the Alternative 3A test plan and its newly-developed alternative structure. It was recommended that Alternative 3A not be tested and that FORSCOM be permitted to implement its proposed alternative organization. The VCSA decided to not test Alternative 3A. He also directed that the ARSTAF review the FORSCOM proposal as the leading candidate to solve the Army's command, control and mobilization problems. An ad hoc group was formed to staff the FORSCOM proposal in a short period of time. Most ACCS-82 personnel were recalled to join the ad hoc group along with other ARSTAF and MACOM representatives. The ad hoc group was charged to examine the FORSCOM alternative, identify associated problems, compare it with ACCS-82 recommendations and work with FORSCOM to determine how the new organizational concept would work in MOBEX 80. The staffing actions of the ad hoc group were directed toward completing additional details of the proposal and making a staff recommendation to the VCSA during early-December.

Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) Concept

1. Executive Summary.

a. Short Description. Inactivate ARR headquarters; activate Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) headquarters; activate one additional AC corps headquarters; provide dedicated mob planners to HQDA, FORSCOM, CONUSA and all mobilization stations; limited OPCON of selected RC units given to MACOM.

b. Characteristics.

(1) HQDA. A dedicated staff group is formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). Personnel spaces for the AMPS group are from current HQDA authorizations or overstrength positions.

(2) MACOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM. Selected MACOM assume limited OPCON of specified RC units for mobilization planning, training supervision and evaluation. The OPCON relationship exists between selected RC non-deploying or late deploying units and the MACOM to which they are first assigned or attached upon mobilization. The MACOM, in this limited OPCON, are viewed as gaining commands. For additional information, see Inclosure 3, "Desirability of MACOM exercising OPCON or Command Over Functional RC Units".

(3) CONUSA. Each CONUSA will receive four additional dedicated mobilization planners.

(4) Corps/Divisions. Organize one additional AC corps headquarters and assign most AC units to the three corps. Majority of the corps support elements of the new corps is in the RC. Dedicated personnel assets are provided to administer and enhance the expanded affiliation program.

(5) ARR. Inactivate the nine ARR headquarters.

(6) ARMR. Activate nine ARMR using the resources of the inactivated ARR headquarters plus resources from RG and Advisor-Advisor/Augmentee TDA. Station ARMR at current ARR locations. ARMR perform most current ARR missions. ARMR areas of geographic responsibility are the same as the ARR which they replace. Each ARMR will supervise all mobilization planning within its region and will, from M-Day and beyond, exercise limited OPCON for mobilization and deployment execution over mobilization stations within its region; additionally, each ARMR will, from M-Day and beyond, command the STARC within its region. The ARMR commander is designated "CONUSA DCG for ARMR (Roman Numeral)." Organization of ARMR headquarters will be similar to the ARR headquarters which they replace, but with a Plans Division added.

(7) RG / Advisors - Advisors/Augmentees. Assigned to ARMR headquarters. No change to organization; however, manpower authorizations are subject to revision based upon FY 80 FORSCOM manpower survey.


(8) ARCOM. ARCOM are given post-mobilization missions to command selected mobilization stations (See Incl 5) and to prepare to form corps or division headquarters in support of total mobilization.

(9) Other MUSARC/GOCOM. No change.

(10) Installations. Additional dedicated mobilization planning assets are provided for most mobilization installations; most will be provided at least one dedicated mobilization planner. At installations with peak personnel mobilization loads of 20,000, or greater, two dedicated mobilization planners will be provided. ARMR are in the mobilization installations' mobilization planning chain of command; ARMR will issue planning guidance to mobilization stations and mobilization stations must have their mobilization plans approved by ARMR. From M-Day, and beyond, each ARMR will exercise limited OPCON over mobilization stations within its region for purposes of personnel and materiel asset redistribution in the event that HQDA vertical management systems are incapable of handling requirements to meet deployment schedules.

(11) Organization Diagram.

Figure 1. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) Concept



3. Resource Summary.

a. Manpower.*

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC FT</u>	<u>DAC</u>
Inactivate ARR	- 339	- 15	- 97
Eliminate Bn Advisors**	- 161		
Activate ARMR	+ 500	+ 15	+ 97
Added CONUSA Mob Planners	+ 9		+ 3
Added FORSCOM Mob Planners	+ 3		
Added to MACOM For Tng OPCON		+ 8	
Added Corps HHC	+ 329		
Added Corps Signal Bde	+ 691		
Added Corps Affiliation Mgrs	+ 3	+ 6	
Added BASOPS			+ 52
Mobilization Station Planners	+ 23		+ 41
Net Impact	+1377	+ 14	+ 96
(Net Impact Without Signal Add on)	+ 367	+ 14	+ 44

* Includes a net increase of 3 AC GO.

** Approximate number. Actual number is dependent on completion of FORSCOM FY 80 manpower survey.

b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternative)	<u>\$171,183.7</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>+\$ 24,354.7</u>
Annual Operating Cost w/o Signal Add on	<u>\$149,436.8</u>
One time Implementation Cost	<u>\$ 57,050.6</u>

4. Comparison with Base Case.

ADVANTAGES

- . Provides valid, well-defined post-mobilization mission to all headquarters.
- . Reduces FORSCOM span of control.
- . Provides required corps headquarters.
- . Enhances potential for improving mobilization and deployment planning.

- . Provides additional assets for mobilization planning at installations, CONUSA, FORSCOM and HQDA.
- . Enhances total mobilization capability.
- . Retains potential to enhance combat readiness of assigned units.
- . Establishes functional training relationships through peacetime assignment (limited OPCON) of RC units to mobilization MACOM.
- . Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions and USAR schools through limited OPCON relationship with TRADOC.
- . Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.

DISADVANTAGES

- . May cause a perceived degradation of USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises limited OPCON.
- . Requires additional resources to activate the corps headquarters and required signal support.
- . Does not eliminate a perceived unnecessary layer in the AC management structure for the RC.

2. Detailed Description.

a. Narrative Description.

(1) General.

(a) The major intermediate command and control headquarters for USAR units are the Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), which include Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). Most MUSARC, except ARCOM, are functionally or doctrinally organized to command and provide assistance to similar subordinate units and are generally effective. The GAO, in a report dated 25 Apr 79, on the Army and Air Force Selected Reserve, stated that ARCOM were essentially administrative rather than command and control headquarters and that ARCOM are neither staffed for, nor capable of, providing meaningful technical guidance to their units. Most assistance to ARCOM units is provided by AC units and the AC elements of the RC management structure. The ARCOM have also been criticized because they did not have what was considered to be a valid, long-term post-mobilization mission.

(b) The ARR have been criticized by GAO, as well as OSD, as being headquarters in the RC management structure which duplicate, unnecessarily, many of the functions of the CONUSA, RG and unit advisors; the functions of the Readiness Coordinators have most often been cited as the duplicating effort within the ARR headquarters.

(c) The GAO study recognized the requirement for an Army management structure in CONUS that must be able to supervise and assist Reserve units not only during peacetime, but also during the critical period of mobilization. The GAO study stated that deficiencies exist in the Army's organizational mechanisms for developing and coordinating mobilization plans and in the plans themselves. The major deficiencies cited by the study include: FORSCOM's span of mobilization planning responsibilities is overextended; many of the requirements necessary to plan and support mobilization have not been identified; and installations' mobilization plans are outdated, incomplete, or nonexistent.

(d) Today's peacetime environment, and concomitant resource constraints, further complicates the mobilization process. The Army is moving from a mobilization and development system based upon unit readiness to the much more responsive and more complex system of force readiness. Force readiness includes those management actions necessary to deploy, on schedule and fully capable of doing their wartime tasks, units which are not fully ready in their peacetime state. Development of a force readiness management system (including ways to measure force readiness) is not an option for the Army: the management systems are required by the existence of understrength units, shortfalls in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and large shortages of unit equipment. During the past year many actions have been taken which provide a foundation for force readiness management. These actions include:

1 CAPSTONE. A program that rationalizes the entire CONUS Army force structure by describing a specific mission and wartime organizational placement

for every active and reserve component unit in the peacetime force.

2 Division/Brigade Partnership Program. A program to link the eight divisions and 24 combat brigades of the ARNG and USAR with an AC division or brigade for mutual support during peacetime training.

3 MACOM Limited OPCON of Selected RC Units. A program to establish a formal relationship (Limited OPCON) between CONUS MACOM and the RC units whose mobilization mission will be in those commands.

4 FORSCOM - USAREUR Planning. Routine and detailed coordination between the FORSCOM and USAREUR staffs for reinforcement planning has been institutionalized.

5 Rapid Deployment Force. Planning is well along to earmark all elements of the programmed, corps-sized force.

6 Total Mobilization. Recognition that mobilization planning should include a concept for expansion to total mobilization and designation of organizations to prepare for the expansion.

7 Civil Assistance and Continental Defense. The CONUS Army must provide an area-oriented command and control system to provide whatever assistance is appropriate in the event of attacks on the Continental United States.

(e) This alternative is aimed at providing an organization that is responsive to the force readiness management requirements. These requirements include the responsibility to: provide responsive training support to the RC; strengthen the management of the USAR; and, provide an organizational structure to manage "force readiness" and the mobilization process. The ARMR will strengthen the force readiness management of RC units because this organizational structure:

1 Maintains the basic organizational structure that has improved the peacetime training of the RC.

2 Provides a mobilization planning and execution mission to the ARMR headquarters which can be implemented on a regional basis.

3 Provides an organizational structure that facilitates centralized mobilization planning.

4 Provides a structure to execute mobilization on a decentralized basis.

5 Provides increased support to USAR command and administration.

(f) The CONUS area-oriented command and control structure for FORSCOM units will include FORSCOM, Corps, CONUSA, ARMR, MUSARC, and the STARC (upon mobilization). The presence of each element is necessary for FORSCOM to prop-

erly perform its missions and functions. The FORSCOM span of control includes three CONUSA, 21 installations, 19 major troop units and 11 field operating activities. This broad span of control, plus the diversity of missions, have required that FORSCOM delegate much of its RC management authority to the CONUSA, which does not change in this alternative. The CONUSA DCG (ARMR Commander) provides a level of experience and authority which is essential to deal with a variety of functions on a regional geographic basis. Similarly, the CONUSA commander provides to the RC the individual attention of a senior AC commander who commands the USAR and controls assets for rendering assistance to the RC. CONUSA management, training, formation of new units and sustaining forces functions will continue throughout the period of full and total mobilization.

(g) The ARMR's peacetime missions include those RC training supervision missions currently performed by the ARR, and mobilization planning. The mobilization role is the result of the need to decentralize execution and is greater than the current mobilization role of the ARRs. (The change in designation from ARR to ARMR reflects the increased mobilization responsibilities at the regional level). The ARMR will maintain full-time mobilization planning staffing and will be the managers of the mobilization process in their respective regions. The ARMR will require access to management information systems, as will the CONUSA, to provide unit personnel and equipment status visibility. Mobilization will greatly burden the existing vertical personnel and supply systems; the ARMR will have a limited backup role in the personnel and supply systems supporting mobilization. The ARMR will provide an intermediate level for control in an area-oriented command and control structure; geographical areas of responsibility coincide with the existing Readiness Region areas.

(h) The MUSARC provide the area-oriented command structure for USAR units in peacetime and, upon mobilization, expedite the mobilization process. The ARCOM commanders will assume command of specified installations (See Inclosure 5) and thereby fill the void created by deploying AC commanders and the installation command requirement created by activating inactive or State-operated mobilization stations. The ARCOM will also be given the "on order" mission to form corps/division headquarters during total mobilization.

(i) FORSCOM is taking several initiatives to improve the RC command administrative support. A manpower survey of the ARR headquarters, RC, and Advisor-Advisor/Augmentee organizations is being conducted. The results of this survey will define manpower requirements and highlight duplicative functions. The survey is scheduled for completion by July 1980. FORSCOM is initiating a study to determine the utility of consolidating certain RC management "book-keeping" functions at selected installations. This involves a complete review of AR 5-9 support responsibilities and management evaluation of functions now performed by ARR and ARCOM. The ARMR, by virtue of their geographic areas of responsibility, are basic to the development of the study concept.

b. Command Relationships and Responsibility for Area and Subordinate Elements.


(1) There are no changes to command relationships between HQDA and

MACOM.

(2) Command relationships between all MACOM, less HSC, and mobilization stations are modified to the extent that ARMR have responsibility and authority for review of all mobilization planning (less expansion of the training base) on a regional basis. Details of these relationships are contained in Inclosure 1, "Summary of Command Relationships."

Command relationships between FORSCOM and its major deployable AC organizations are modified by activating one additional corps headquarters and assigning all major deployable AC organizations to one of the three FORSCOM corps as shown below.

Figure 2. Command Relationships-FORSCOM and Major Deployable AC Organizations.



(a) Reserve component units are designated to fill out the headquarters command and control elements and the subordinate combat support and combat service support unit structure of the new corps. RC units have a peacetime Affiliation relationship with the corps similar to that currently in effect for combat units. RC units to fill out the corps will be identified by the CAPSTONE program now in progress at FORSCOM.

(b) The corps commander, in accordance with FORSCOM directives, develops training guidance and requirements, and reviews training programs; recommends to FORSCOM, on an exception basis, funding adjustments between units/installations; insures standardization of training under applicable FORSCOM directives; and monitors program accomplishment.

(c) III Corps commands Ft. Hood, the 2d Armd Div, 1st Cav Div, 5th Inf Div (M), 6th ACB, and all other FORSCOM units at Ft. Hood. The 1st Inf Div (M) is assigned, less operational control. The commanders of the 5th Inf Div (M) and the 1st Inf Div (M) command Ft. Polk and Ft. Riley, respectively, plus all assigned units at their installations.

(d) XVIII Abn Corps commands Ft. Bragg, the 82d Adn Div, 101st Div (AASLT), 24th Inf Div, and all other FORSCOM units at Ft. Bragg. The commanders of the 24th Inf Div and 101st Div (AASLT) command Ft. Stewart and Ft. Campbell, respectively, plus all assigned units at their installations.

(e) Western Corps commands Ft. Lewis, the 9th Inf Div, 4th Inf Div (M), the 7th Inf Div and all other FORSCOM units at Ft. Lewis. The commanders of the 4th Inf Div and 7th Inf Div command Ft. Carson and Ft. Ord, respectively, plus all assigned units at their installations.

(f) TRADOC school support provided by FORSCOM units continues unchanged; however, corps commanders will closely monitor units involved in these missions to insure maintenance of combat readiness.

(4) Command relationships between FORSCOM and CONUSA are unchanged.

(5) Command relationships below CONUSA are modified to the extent that: ARMR headquarters replace ARR headquarters; and, from M-Day and beyond, the ARMR headquarters command STARC within their region; and, from M-Day and beyond, the ARMR headquarters exercise limited OPCON over mobilization stations within their region for the execution of mobilization and deployment.

c. Functions and Responsibilities.

(1) This alternative has no major immediate impact upon organization, procedures, operations or resources at HQDA level. The addition of one active corps headquarters does, however, enable the Army to satisfy contingency requirements for one additional deployable corps. Assets are provided, for up to a two year period, to staff a dedicated element within HQDA to develop a mobilization planning system which may modify future procedures and operations.

(2) This alternative reduces FORSCOM's AC span of control, by having most AC major units assigned to one of the three active corps headquarters which are subordinate to FORSCOM. Retaining functions that lend themselves to centralized control under the management of FORSCOM and delegating other functions which require on-the-scene action to the corps commanders should enhance overall readiness. FORSCOM RC span of control is unaffected by this alternative: the three CONUSA continue as the first level below FORSCOM for command and control of all USAR units and for training supervision of ARNG units. The CONUSA spans of control are unchanged. There is no change to current financial management procedures. Mobilization and mobilization station planning is enhanced by the addition of dedicated assets at levels from FORSCOM through installations. The ARMR will maintain the same basic staff elements of the ARR, but will additionally organize a plans division. The plans division will be responsible for mobilization planning within the region. The ARMR, upon mobilization, will be the central authority within the region for coordination of mobilization execution.

(3) The three Continental US Army (CONUSA) retain essentially the same structure, missions, and functions currently assigned. Major changes in the revised structure are that the ARR HQ are reorganized as ARMR HQ. The ARMR commander is designated CONUSA DCG for his region. The ARMR continue to perform the ARR functions and assume the missions of mobilization planning and direction of mobilization execution. The responsibility for mobilization planning includes responsibility/authority to: (a) Review, coordinate and approve RC unit mobilization plans/files; (b) Review and coordinate installation mobilization plans; (c) Approve FORSCOM installation mobilization plans and those portions of other MACOM (less HSC) installation mobilization plans related to mobilizing RC units; (d) Provide advice and assistance to RC units in the preparation of mobilization plans for direct deploying units, movement plans, COM-PASS reports, MOBEX and EDRE exercise; (e) Plan for OPCON of mobilization stations; (f) Plan for command of STARC. During mobilization, the ARMR will exercise limited OPCON of mobilization stations, less HSC installations, within their regions. OPCON is for purposes of RC unit mobilization execution, redistribution of assets within established guidelines, and certification for deployment of RC and specified AC units. During post-mobilization operations the ARMR assumes command of STARC. Readiness Groups remain as presently configured and are assigned to the ARMR. Advisors are assigned to the ARMR, but many battalion-level advisors are eliminated. (NOTE: The exact number will be determined by HQ FORSCOM, working in conjunction with NGB and OCAR). The implementation of full-time manning and the continued effort of the RG in support of all RC units fill the void created by any elimination of battalion advisors. Additional Affiliation Program units are provided assistance by the sponsoring AC units. This action eliminates the duplication of functions that exists between battalion advisors and the RG. These resources can best be utilized by providing dedicated mobilization planners for mobilization installations, CONUS, ARMR headquarters and the corps.

(4) Army planning documents cite a requirement for additional early deployable tactical corps headquarters in the event of certain contingencies. Considering the time elements of certain deployment plans, one additional corps

headquarters should be organized and trained prior to mobilization. One of the essential elements of training tactical corps headquarters and supporting commands is the capability to conduct command post and field training exercises with full command and control representation, including communications. The minimum signal requirement that must be activated in the AC is the Signal Brigade HHC, Corps Command Operation Battalion and the Corps Radio Battalion. The HHC and the two battalions organized at ALO 3 require a total of 1010 spaces.

(a) The activation of the required units enables the corps to meet required deployment dates and provides the essential elements of the Corps Signal Brigade. The remaining required brigade signal units will be identified in the RC by the CAPSTONE program, or will be provided by reorganization /activation of RC units time-phased over a three year period.

(b) Activation of a third CONUS corps headquarters and certain required corps structure for FORSCOM would reduce the FORSCOM AC span of control significantly. Additionally, this action creates relationships in peacetime similar to those of wartime and enhances training and readiness of both RC and AC units.

(c) The added corps headquarters and supporting elements can best be accommodated at Fort Lewis, WA. Each of the three AC corps commands the installation on which it is located. Division commanders, not collocated with a Corps Hq, command their installations. The corps is responsible for the combat readiness of all assigned and attached units. Although readiness reporting continues to flow directly from installations to FORSCOM, the corps commander monitors all aspects of readiness of the organizations under his command. The action results in these specific advantages:

1 Increased standardization in interpretation of FORSCOM policies and guidance.

2 Standardization of implementation and evaluation of the ARTEP.

3 Increased capability to spot the need to act to cross-level existing materiel assets to meet real-time training and operational requirements.

4 Valuable exchange of information on problems, challenges and solutions between major units on a more timely basis.

5 The potential to conduct more frequent training and operational readiness team visits.

(d) Each corps commander will rate, and the commander FORSCOM will indorse, all assigned division and separate brigade/group/regiment commanders.

(e) Reserve component units are identified to complete the required headquarters command and control elements and the subordinate unit structure of the new corps. RC units have a peacetime Affiliation Program relationship with the corps similar to that currently existing in CONUS between combat RC and AC units. Both RC and AC dedicated assets are provided to each corps headquarters

for management and enhancement of the expanded Affiliation Program.

(5) There will be one dedicated military mobilization planner for each mobilization station (MS) with a projected mobilization population over 3,000. For those 22 active MS whose peak projected mobilization population exceeds 20,000, one additional planner is authorized. Thus, a total of 64 spaces are required to establish dedicated mobilization planners at MS. These resources are in addition to those authorizations designated in current TDA. The additional dedicated resources at each installation should be placed under the installation DPT. Assignment by installation is at Inclosure 4. The resources designated for State-operated installations will be assigned to a nearby active MS as shown below:

Table 1. Responsibility for Dedicated Mobilization Planners.

<u>State-Operated MS</u>	<u>Active MS</u>
Camp Atterbury	Ft. B. Harrison
Camp Grayling	Ft. Sheridan
Camp Ripley	Ft. McCoy
Camp Roberts	Ft. Ord
Camp Shelby	Ft. Polk
Ft. Irwin	Ft. Ord
Gowen Field	Ft. Lewis
Camp Edwards	Ft. Devens
Blanding	Ft. Stewart

d. Staffing Concept.

(1) At HQDA a dedicated staff organization is established for up to two years to develop and implement the Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). The AMPS office is under the direct, full time supervision of a Major General. Eighteen personnel are provided. A discussion of the AMPS is at Inclosure 2.

(2) FORSCOM is authorized three additional mobilization planning officers to augment the current mobilization planning staff.

(3) Each CONUSA headquarters is authorized four additional mobilization planning officers to augment the current mobilization planning staff. Deputy Commanding Generals (DCG), in the grade of Major General, are assigned to each CONUSA headquarters to assume functions formerly assigned to the APR commanders. The DCG will not be used to supervise the CONUSA headquarters staffs, but rather

will devote all their efforts towards RC advice, training and supervision; all aspects of mobilization planning and execution; and command of ARMR elements. Specific responsibilities for the DCG will be determined by CONUSA commanders. Given the spans of control for subordinate organizations and geographic dispersion/distances for required travel, the minimum number of DCG are: First Army - four, Fifth Army - three, and Sixth Army - two.

(4) Each ARMR headquarters is staffed based upon the existing ARR headquarters structure (DA Pam 570-554) plus authorizations to accomplish the added missions of mobilization planning and execution. Spaces to accomplish the added missions, which are in the Plans Division, were developed in consideration of locations, types, numbers of RC units and strengths and the number and locations of mobilization stations and STARC within each region. As experience is gained with the ARMR headquarters organizations, each TDA will be adjusted based upon actual workload factors. Space authorizations for RG and Advisors-Advisors/Augmentees will be adjusted based upon the results of the FORSCOM FY 80 manpower survey and in consultation with the NGB and OCAR.

(5) Additional (West Coast) CONUS Corps.

(a) Organization concept.

1 The corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company is activated at ALO 3 in the active forces using TOE 52-002H4 (MTOE) (Inclosure 7) with an authorized strength of 329 military personnel.

2 An active COSCOM section of 19 personnel (Inclosure 8) is included in the corps staff with the primary function of mobilization planning and staff interface with the RC COSCOM. The COSCOM HHC will perform annual training (AT) at Ft. Lewis.

3 A ten-man cell of the Field Artillery Section (FAS) (Inclosure 9) will provide mobilization and operational planning and staff interface with the Affiliated RC FAS and FA Brigades. The specific RC units to be affiliated with the corps will be identified by FORSCOM's CAPSTONE program.

4 The corps Signal Brigade (Inclosure 10) is formed from programed AC assets and the reorganization or activation of two RC battalions. The units required are as follows:

a HHC Signal Brigade (TOE 11-420H) is activated in the AC. The unit is organized at a decremented ALO 3 and requires 110 personnel. The Corps C-E section merges with the brigade HHC when formed.

b Command Operations Battalion (TOE 11-405H) is activated in the AC and is organized at ALO-3. The total requirement for the Operations Battalion is 343 manpower spaces (203 new plus 140 existing). The 176th SC Co, Ft. Lewis, WA, is scheduled for reorganization to a SC Company (Med HQS Opns) (TOE 11-127H) in FY 80, and will be authorized 140 manpower spaces. One-hundred and nine of these existing spaces could be considered for use in organizing the Support Com-

pany (TOE 11-409H) of the Command Operations Battalion. The remaining 31 manpower spaces could be applied to other elements of the Command Operations Battalion.

c Corps Radio Signal Battalion (TOE 11-425H) is activated in the AC, with a total ALO 3 personnel requirement of 531.

d Cable and Wire Company (TOE 11-423H), Corps Signal Brigade. The 58th Signal Battalion (Cable) (TOE 11-045G), Ft. Lewis, WA, is scheduled for reorganization to a SC Company (Cable/Wire) (TOE 11-423H) (185 manpower spaces) under the "Echelons Above Division" EAD concept. This company is being reorganized because of established requirements within the total Army structure. This unit can be included as part of West Coast Corps Signal Brigade and organized at ALO-3 (170) spaces). The 15 residual spaces resulting from the ALO-3 organization could be applied against the Signal Brigade space requirement.

e Corps Area Signal Battalion (TOE 11-415H). The Corps Signal Brigade is authorized four Corps Area Signal Battalions for wartime purposes. For peacetime operations, the Corps Signal Brigade is authorized only two Corps Area Signal Battalions. These battalions provide an integral part of the total communications system for the corps. There are no corps Area Signal Battalions currently available or programmed for activation in the AC. Further, there are no RC Corps Area Signal Battalions within the Sixth Army Area to support this action. There are, however, RC units in the Sixth Army area which could be reorganized into two area support battalions.

(b) Type Staff. There is no change to the current corps type staff; the FAS is reduced and the COSCOM section is included in the MTOE.

(c) Rationale for Staffing. Although sufficient AC units may not be available for the entire command and control structure for the additional corps headquarters, its supporting RC units are available to reduce the shortfall. Designated RC units will maintain a peacetime relationship with the corps through the Affiliation Program. The RC units, by virtue of this relationship, will receive a thorough grounding in the use of the corps SOP and will be trained in peacetime by working with the corps headquarters under which they could operate in wartime. The RC units affiliated with the corps will be required to perform AT at Ft. Lewis and to participate in corps CPX/FTX whenever possible. The corps will augment training assistance currently given to the RC by the RG.

e. Stationing.

(1) CONUSA. No change.

(2) ARMR. No change from ARR locations.

(3) Corps. Two additional military manpower spaces (corps Affiliation Program Managers) are added to the corps at Ft. Hood and Ft. Bragg. Ft. Lewis

increases by 1,339; 329 for the Corps HHC and 1,010 for the AC portion of the Corps Signal Bde.

(4) Installations.

(a) There is no major stationing impact. Stationing of an added corps headquarters and supporting signal elements can be accommodated at Ft. Lewis, WA. Lines of communication, time-distance factors and economics of support make Ft. Lewis the best location. Although renovation of administrative space is required at Ft. Lewis, the cost would be less than at other locations. Placing the new corps headquarters at Ft. Lewis gives it direct lines of communication with the 4th and 7th Divisions and colocates it with the 9th Division. A comparison of candidate stations is at Inclosure 11. Additional stationing considerations are as follows:

1 Seattle is serviced by both a civilian and military airport and by four major airlines.

2 Administrative space required for the corps HHC is available, with minimal alteration, at Ft. Lewis.

3 BEQ and BOQ spaces are available at Ft. Lewis for the HHC and Signal Battalions. Government family housing is not available, but suitable housing is available in the local area.

4 Autovon circuitry would need to be increased and the telephone outside plant would probably need extension.

(b) The total increases in personnel at Ft. Lewis are:

1 Corps Hq: 329

2 Additional BASOPS support required for the corps HQ: 13

3 Total first increment: 342

4 The activation of Signal Bde HHC and the two signal battalions will add 1010 spaces plus 39 additional personnel for BASOPS support.

5 Maximum additional personnel: 1372

(c) Health Services Command will not require any increase in personnel. Madigan Army Hospital could absorb the increased load without a significant impact.

e. Effects on Management Systems.

(1) There are no changes to the current personnel, logistics and financial management systems. ADP support effect and cost were assessed for administrative management and reporting and command and control (WWMCCS). For

administrative management and reporting, FORSCOM is currently developing a proposal for a CONUS Army MIS (CAMIS) which would provide ADP support to the CONUSA, ARR, RG, MUSARC, and RC units. CAMIS is assumed to represent the ADP support requirement for RC management under FORSCOM. CAMIS will provide modern mini-computers and terminal systems at the CONUSA, ARMR, and MUSARC, and will place terminals in the RG and units. Establishment of the ARMR and disestablishment of the ARR will not affect prototype and extension costs of CAMIS or the overall annual cost of supplies and communications (circuits to terminals). Under this alternative the ARMR will require a mini-computer system similar to the CONUSA system. Table 2 shows the computers and monthly cost at headquarters affected by this alternative. Other costs associated with CAMIS will not change as a result of this alternative and total ADP support provided by the BASOPS DPI will not change. There is no increase in ADP support cost for RC management under this alternative.

Table 2. Headquarters Computers and Monthly Costs

<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>TYPE ADPE</u>	<u>MONTHLY COST (\$)</u>	<u>CURRENT NR. PLAN- NED</u>	<u>ALT REQ</u>
CONUSA	128K CPU 200MB STOR	5.8K	3	5
ARR/ ARMR	64K CPU 20MB STOR	1.2K	9	9
ARCOM	64K CPU	1.2K	19	19

(2) For command and control (WWMCCS), the ARMR will be the primary CONUSA staff element in both planning and execution for mobilization. ARMR, therefore, require access to WWMCCS through the WES. Each ARMR will require a mini-computer similar to the current CONUSA terminals, for planning, and an additional KSR terminal, for execution. Where the ARMR is collocated with a CONUSA, it can share the CONUSA mini-computer if it is provided an additional ("smart") work station along with a KSR terminal. Where the ARMR is located at a non-divisional posts which already has a KSR terminal, it can share that terminal and needs only a mini-computer terminal.

(3) At divisional posts the ARMR must have its own dedicated mini-computer, but it can share a KSR terminal, since all division installations are programmed to get a KSR and a CRT terminal. Estimated ADPE cost are shown in Table 3. Secure site preparation installation costs for WES terminals are estimated at \$5K per site. At installations which already have WES terminals, it is assumed that one site will be shared and a second site will be required. At installations without a WES terminal, the ARMR will require two separate sites (one in Plans, one in the Operations Center). These costs are also shown in Table 3. Each additional ADPE device shown in Table 3 will require a communications circuit except for work stations. WES circuit costs are estimated at \$10K per year per circuit. Each circuit must also be secured at a one-time pur-

chase cost of \$13K per terminal. These costs are also shown in Table 3.

Table 3. ADPE Costs

ARMR	POST	ADPE	COST/ MO(\$)	SITE PREP	CIRCUIT \$1	CRYPTO
I	Devens (MA)	64K MINI	550	5K	10K	13K
II	Dix (NJ)	64K MINI	550	5K	10K	13K
III	Meade (MD)	Work Sta KSR	150 100	5K	10K	13K
IV	Gillem (GA)	Work Sta KSR	150 100	5K	10K	13K
V	Sheridan (IL)	64K MINI	550	5K	10K	13K
VI	Knox (KY)	64K MINI	550	5K	10K	13K
VII	Sam Houston (TX)	Work Sta KSR	150 100	5K	10K	13K
VIII	Fitzsimons (CO)	64K MINI	550	5K	10K	13K
IX	Presidio of SF (CA)	Work Sta KSR	150 100	5K	10K	13K
	TOTAL		3500	45K	90K	117K
	ANNUAL COST		42K		90K	
	ONE TIME			45K		117K

(4) The WWMCCS/WES terminal support for this alternative will be approximately \$132K per year for ADPE and circuits and approximately \$162K in investment (one-time) costs for secure sites and crypto equipment.

f. Resource Summary

(1) Manpower.*

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RCFT</u>	<u>DAC</u>
MACOM Staffing for OPCON		+ 8	
FORSCOM MOB Planners	+ 3		
CONUSA MOB Planners	+ 9		+ 3
Activate Corps HQ and Signal Units	+1339		
Corps/Division Roundout/Affiliation Managers	+ 3	+ 6	
Organize 9 ARMR	+ 500	+ 15	+ 97
Inactivate ARR	- 339	- 15	- 97
Eliminate Battalion-level	- 161		
Advisors **			
Installation Mob Planners	+ 23		+ 41
Installation BASOPS			+ 52
Net Impact	+1377	+ 14	+ 96
(Net Impact w/o Signal Add-on)	+ 367	+ 14	+ 57
* Includes the following AC General Officer summary:			
<u>Activations/Inactivations</u>	<u>0-9</u>	<u>0-8</u>	<u>0-7</u>
Inactivate ARR		- 9	
Designate CONUSA DCG		+ 9	
Activate Corps HQ	+ 1	+ 1	+ 1
TOTALS	+ 1	+ 1	+ 1

** Number Approximate. The number of battalion-level advisors to be deleted is dependent on decisions made following completion of the FORSCOM FY 80 manpower survey.

(2) Costs.

(a) Estimated Annual Operating Costs (thousands of dollars (\$000)).

	<u>MIL PERS COST</u>	<u>CIV PERS COST</u>	<u>OTHER O&M</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Current Annual Cost	94,501.3	32,490.2	19,837.2	146,828.7
Inactivate ARR HQ	- 9,491.5	- 1,649.6	- 1,209.8	- 12,350.9
Eliminate Battalion- Level Advisors*	- 3,675.5		- 409.8	- 4,085.3
Subtotal	<u>-13,167.0</u>	<u>- 1,649.6</u>	<u>- 1,619.6</u>	<u>- 16,436.2</u>
Activate ARMR	+13,167.0	+ 1,649.6	1,619.6	+ 16,436.2
Activate Corps HHC	+ 6,700.4		+ 590.7	7,291.1
Activate Corps Sig Bde (-)	+10,634.7		+ 2,649.0	+ 13,283.7
Mob Station Planners	+ 512.9	+ 943.0	+ 192.0	+ 1,647.9
Corps Affiliation Program Managers	+ 243.9		+ 27.0	+ 270.9
CONUSA Mob Planners	+ 243.9	+ 78.3	+ 36.0	+ 358.2
CONUSA Training OPCON	+ 216.8		+ 24.0	+ 240.8
FORSCOM MOB Planners	81.3		+ 9.0	+ 90.3
Increase BASOPS		+ 866.9	+ 304.9	+ 1,171.8
Subtotal	<u>+31,800.9</u>	<u>+ 3,537.8</u>	<u>+ 5,452.2</u>	<u>+ 40,790.9</u>
Net Change	+18,633.9	+ 1,888.2	+ 3,832.6	+ 24,354.7
Alternative Annual Operating Cost-TOTAL	113,135.2	34,378.4	23,669.8	171,183.4

(b) One-time costs (thousands of dollars (\$000)).

Military Personnel Movement	1,291.6
Investment and Operations	55,301.0
ADP	<u>458.0</u>
TOTAL	57,050.6

* Approximate. The number of battalion-level advisors to be deleted is dependent on decisions made following completion of the FORSCOM FY 80 manpower survey.

g. Comparison with the Base Case.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Provides valid, well-defined post mobilization mission to all headquarters. ARMR, as an extension of the CONUSA HQ, are responsible for coordination of mobilization on a regional basis. ARCOM will command specified installations and will be prepared to form corps/division headquarters for total mobilization.

(b) Reduces the FORSCOM span of control by adding one AC corps headquarters and assigning all major FORSCOM AC units to the three corps.

(c) Provides the Army an additional, required, deployable corps headquarters.

(d) The ARMR, with its additional resources for exercising OPCON over mobilization stations for mobilization planning and direction of execution, will enhance the potential for improving mobilization and deployment planning.

e. Provides additional personnel at HQDA, FORSCOM, CONUSA, ARMR and at mobilization installations with mobilization populations of more than 3,000 personnel to insure that required mobilization planning is accomplished.

(f) The CONUSA (with the ARMR) and STARC (upon mobilization) provide the FORSCOM commander the means to plan and execute missions on a geographic basis. This structure will be a stable and experienced organization for the execution of mobilization, domestic contingency and MSCD plans.

(g) Enhances the readiness of units assigned to the corps by: (1) the increased capability to identify the need and to act to cross-level existing personnel and materiel assets to meet real-time training and operational requirements. (2) standardization of implementation and evaluation of the ARTEP. (3) valuable exchange of information on problems, challenges and solutions between the corps staff and the major units in a timely manner, (4) increased capability for more frequent command, training, and operational readiness team visits.

(h) Provides Affiliation Program support for all RC units designated to round out the new corps. Combat support and combat service support units will be afforded the same benefits as the existing combat unit Affiliation Program. Three additional officers will be assigned to each corps G-3 section (1-AC, 1-USAR and 1-ARNG) to provide a dedicated effort for organizing, monitoring and enhancing the expanded Affiliation Program.

(i) Enhances the readiness of those RC units affiliated with the corps by increased training assistance in addition to that provided by the RG and assigned advisors. The Affiliation Program also creates a sense of belonging between the affiliated units and the AC corps with which they may deploy.

(j) The MACOM-RC unit limited OPCON relationship provides for limited OPCON of specified RC units by CONUS MACOM. For TRADOC, this relationship includes training divisions and USAR schools, which will improve the doctrinal supervision of these organizations.

(k) Provides a command and control structure that enhances the transition from full to total mobilization and for the defense of CONUS. The ARCOM provide a nucleus for corps and division headquarters. The CONUSA, with their geographical extensions, the ARMR and the STARC, are the only military command and control structures in CONUS capable of executing the CONUS defense mission.

(1) Minimizes reorganizational turbulence.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The exercise of limited OPCON by TRADOC over USAR Schools may cause a perceived degradation of school support to units and individuals since FORSCOM will not have full command of both USAR schools and the units that they support.

(b) Requires additional manpower spaces for the corps headquarters and signal support.

(c) The perception exists that there is unnecessary layering in the AC management structure for the RC. This alternative does not substantially change that AC management structure.

h. Development and Testing.

(1) The ARMR concept will be implemented by immediately assigning the ARMR mission to the ARR. The ARR will perform that mission to the extent possible with readily available resources. By so doing, a "manual" management system will evolve for performing the mission. FORSCOM, in conjunction with HQDA and other concerned MACOM, will oversee the evolution of the "manual" system and will standardize it, to the extent appropriate, by issuing manual system specifications. Simultaneously, ARMR TDA will be developed to support the "manual" system. The word "manual," as used above, does not imply the absence of ADP support. To the extent that ADP-generated information is readily available, or can be made so on an interim and cost-effective basis, it will be used. "Manual" merely implies that a total, automated information system will not be in existence to support the ARMR until CAMIS is available in 1982. The evolving "manual" system will be used during MOBEX 80. A specific analysis task for MOBEX 80 should be to evaluate the utility of the ARMR in performing its mobilization planning and execution missions.

(2) Schedule.

ARMR Concept Approval	Jan 80
Mission Assignment to ARR	Feb 80
"Manual" System Specifications Issued	Mar 80
ARMR TDA Approved	Apr 80
ADPE/C-E Interim Support	As Required
MOBEX 80	Fall 80
ADPE Support (CAMIS)	1982

Inclosure 1

Summary of Command Relationships

Summary
of
Command Relationships

The primary objective of the Army's command and control system during mobilization is to bring the mobilized RC deploying units, and deploying AC units, to levels of manning, equipment, POR/POM, and training necessary to deploy. In general, procedures for deploying AC units are satisfactory. Therefore, the changes to the current systems and procedures that follow address primarily the activities involving mobilized RC units.

a. Two fundamental changes are made at the HQDA level:

(1) HQDA, not FORSCOM, will control the planning for mobilization. Included in this control is a requirement for a comprehensive Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS).

(2) HQDA will provide unequivocal guidance to installation commanders concerning priorities for redistribution and cross-leveling of assets.

b. Command and control responsibility for, and authority over units--AC, RC and mobilized RC--is clear-cut. Conditions for defining command relationships are clearly articulated with regard to responsibilities and authority, time and geography. Additionally, responsibilities and authority associated with the term "operational control" are specified.

(1) Corps commanders have responsibility and authority to control and supervise forces and to plan, direct and evaluate training for all units assigned or attached to the corps.

(2) Installation commanders exercise command and control over units located on their installations. For certain units, such as those of "stovepipe" agencies (HSC, ACC, CIDC), the technique of "host-supported" agreements is appropriate.

(3) ARR headquarters are eliminated, and ARMR are activated in their place.

(4) Peacetime command of USAR units is accomplished in a chain of command from CONUSA-to-MUSARC-to USAR units.

(5) Upon, and following mobilization, command and control of RC units is as follows:

(a) Mobilized ARNG units and STARC are commanded by ARMR. STARC control the movement of ARNG units to mobilization stations.

(b) USAR units continue to be assigned to CONUSA. CONUSA-MUSARC chain of command controls the movement of USAR units to mobilization stations.

(c) ARNG and USAR units are attached to the mobilization station upon arrival; attachment includes the authority to transfer and promote personnel.

(6) The procedures outlined above place installation commanders clearly in command of units on their installations. The roles of the CONUSA, ARMR and RG are:

(a) CONUSA and ARMR provide FORSCOM the means for decentralization of responsibility during mobilization--a step that is definitely required. The relationship between ARMR and installations is clearly articulated to eliminate the current confusion in the system. Personnel and logistical transactions are "two-player" operations--they involve installations and HQDA "operators." Funding matters are also "two-player" operations--they involve installations and MACOM; however, ARMR are involved in an advisory capacity. To provide the minimum command and control redundancy considered prudent to assure the Army's capability to conduct successful mobilization and deployment, certain modifications to the current system are required. ARMR need to have the capability to perform an integrating and coordinating function for mobilization stations within their areas. It is possible, based on the experience of MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78, that the vertical management systems--and the communications systems--will be overwhelmed by the volume of transactions during the early phases of mobilization. The ARMR provide an "escape value" for these systems. However, the ARMR must have more information than is now available to the CONUSA if they are to be successful as escape valves. The ADPE system and "software" required to support the ARMR have not been defined. The specific elements of information required to exercise decentralized execution of mobilization and the interface requirements with the vertical personnel and logistics will be defined as part of the implementation of the ARMR concept. An initial solution--which is recommended at this time because it can be done quickly and with few resources--involves two steps.

-- HQDA "operators" provide summary displays of installation asset status to HQ FORSCOM in peacetime. FORSCOM uses the summary data to provide recommendations to HQDA (and its operators) for shifting of priorities and assets between installations. The summaries are also provided to CONUSA and ARMR to hold for use as a "starting point" in the event of mobilization.

-- Upon mobilization, installations provide simple, daily SITREPS to the ARMR who in turn provide summary information to CONUSA. The SITREP would include data concerning on-hand status for major equipment, personnel and funds and projected training shortfalls for units. After the initial report, installations report changes only. The SITREP should be designed by HQ FORSCOM (in conjunction with CONUSA, ARMR and installations) and sufficient peacetime training exercises should be conducted to familiarize personnel with the SITREP procedures. If, and only when, the vertical management systems (SIDPERS, SAJLS and STANFINS) are overwhelmed, the ARMR and CONUSA can use the SITREP information to make decisions and recommendations. Until the vertical systems fail, however, the ARMR and CONUSA relationships with installations are purely monitorship of readiness and SITREP data. This is done to prepare the ARMR to exercise OPCON over installations for management of resources for deployment in the event that centralized management systems fail. When HQDA determines that centralized management of resources can no longer be accomplished, HQDA will notify the MACOM that CONUSA and ARMR will temporarily assume OPCON of installations for redistribution of personnel, logistic and financial resources for purposes of meeting readiness for deployment of units. In the interests of simplicity and timeliness, CONUSA will inform HQ FORSCOM (with information copies provided to the affected installations) that "Unless otherwise directed,

the following redistribution actions will be taken at (date-time-group). . .)" To assist in this redistribution action, the CONUSA and ARMOR will position on-site representatives (liaison teams) at every mobilization station.

(b) The RG will form teams (similar to CAMI/MART) to assist the installation commanders in preparing units for deployment. These teams will be attached to the installations.

c. While at mobilization stations, mobilized RG units must:

- (1) Complete required unit training.
- (2) Fill required equipment shortages.
- (3) Fill required personnel shortages.
- (4) Complete POR/POM.

d. Completion of required unit training.

(1) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment training readiness for units. Also shown are the headquarters and/or organizations in the proposed structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

- (a) Determine training status--units, CAMI/MART and installation (DPT).
- (b) Determine training program--units, CAMI/MART and installation (DPT).
- (c) Determine, and coordinate, assistance required beyond capability of unit or installation--CAMI/MART, installation (DPT).
- (d) Conduct training--units, assisted by CAMI/MART and installation (DPT).
- (e) Report status and progress for purposes of training management and deployment planning--units, assisted by CAMI/MART and installation (DPT).
- (f) Certify training readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARMOR, CAMI/MART and installation (DPT)).

(2) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment equipment readiness for units. Also shown are headquarters and/or organizations in the proposed structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

- (a) Determine status of on-hand equipment--units, (assisted by CAMI/MART and installation (DIO)).
- (b) Verify equipment requirements--units and installation (DIO).
- (c) Repair and/or turn-in (job order) equipment--units and installations (DIO).

- (d) Determine equipment shortages--units and installation (DIO).
- (e) Issue available equipment--installation (DIO).
- (f) Requisition equipment shortages--units and installations (DIO).
- (g) Report status and progress for purposes of deployment planning--units and installation (DIO/DPT).
- (h) Certify equipment readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARMR and installation (DIO).

(3) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment personnel readiness for units. Also shown are headquarters and/or organizations in the proposed structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

- (a) Update personnel inventory--units.
- (b) Verify requirements--units and installation (MILPO).
- (c) Reassign non-deployable personnel--installation (MILPO).
- (d) Make grade/MOS substitutions--units and installation (MILPO).
- (e) Determine personnel shortages--units and installation (MILPO).
- (f) Make intra-installation reassignments (cross-level)--installation (MILPO).
- (g) Requisition personnel shortage--installation (MILPO).
- (h) Report status and progress for deployment planning--units and installation (MILPO/DPCA/DPT).
- (i) Certify personnel readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARMR, CAMI/MART and installation (DPCA)).

(4) Preparation of replacements for overseas movement (POR) and unit preparation for overseas movement (POM) are generally "two-player" activities involving units and installations. The CONUSA and ARMR will monitor accomplishment of POR/POM processing in order to assess overall progress toward readiness for deployment.

Inclosure 2

HQDA Mobilization Planning Role

HQDA Mobilization Planning Role

Detailed Description.

a. Concept.

(1) HQDA will develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS).

(2) An AMPS office will be established, under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), to develop and implement the AMPS.

(3) All ARSTAF agencies and MACOM will be assigned roles for performing mobilization planning and for disciplining the AMPS.

(4) The AMPS office will be chartered for up to 24 months and will be disestablished when AMPS is implemented.

(5) The AMPS will:

(a) Define and assign broadened mobilization planning responsibilities for ARSTAF and MACOM.

(b) Incorporate the FORSCOM MPS and its methodology.

(c) Formalize consistent planning processes for all areas of mobilization (i.e., RC units, personnel base, logistics base, etc).

(d) Integrate near-term (current year) planning with mid-term planning (POM) for mobilization.

(e) Integrate mobilization planning with all appropriate Army Planning Systems.

(f) Optimize the use of automated planning aids and automated system interfaces through a structured management of planning information.

b. Command Relationships.

(1) HQDA will have overall responsibility for developing, implementing and disciplining the AMPS. The DCSOPS will have tasking authority over ARSTAF agencies and MACOM for the development and implementation of AMPS. ARSTAF agencies will be assigned specific responsibility for disciplining the AMPS when implemented.

(2) MACOM will be assigned specific missions and functions under AMPS. "DA Executive Agent" terminology will not be used in assigning responsibilities to MACOM.

c. Functions.

(1) HQDA.

(a) The AMPS Office will design, develop and implement the AMPS using

contractor assistance (if necessary) and taskings to analysis agencies, ARSTAF and MACOM.

(b) Mobilization planning functions under current processes or taskings will continue to be performed by responsible ARSTAF agencies until changed, terminated or incorporated into AMPS.

(2) MACOM.

(a) FORSCOM will further develop its Mobilization Planning System for mobilization of RC units under its command, provide assistance to HQDA in developing the AMPS and perform other planning functions as assigned under the AMPS.

(b) Other MACOM will continue to perform current mobilization planning functions until changed, terminated or incorporated into AMPS and will provide assistance, as required, to HQDA for development of AMPS.

d. Stationing. N/A.

e. Responsibility for Area/Subordinate Elements.

TBD by AMPS.

f. Staffing Concept.

(1) HQDA

(a) A dedicated staff organization will be formed for up to two years to develop and implement the AMPS. The AMPS office will be under the direct, full-time supervision of a Major General.

(b) The staffing for the AMPS office will be based on expertise required, since "level of effort" will be accomplished through contractor assistance and tasking of ARSTAF and MACOM, as required. The AMPS office will require full-time expertise in organization, mission, functions, operating concepts and systems of Army MACOM and agencies which play major roles in mobilization. It will also require expertise in planning and management processes for critical functional areas. The following is an estimate of the required personnel based on areas of expertise.

Table 2-1. AMPS Staffing Requirements.

<u>Organizational Expertise</u>	<u>Personnel Required</u>
FORSCOM	1
TRADOC	1
DARCOM	1
RCPAC/MILPERCEN	1
ACC	1
HSC	1
MIMC	
NGB	
OCAR	

Functional Expertise

Force Development	1
Supply & Maintenance	1
JOPS	1
PPBS	1
Trans Systems	1
Facilities Engr	1
Stationing	1
Personnel	1
Comm ADP	1
Training Base	1
Industrial Base	1
ADP System Development	2
ORSA	3
Total	25

If all professional personnel assigned are selected based on a background in at least two of the areas above, twelve professional staff personnel will be required. Six additional supervisory/admin personnel will be required. These include:

Major General	1
Exec (O-6)	1
Admin NCO	1
Clerical	3

Total manpower resources required are, therefore, eighteen (18) spaces for 1 1/2 to 2 years.

(c) Because of limitations on HQDA strength the manpower spaces (18 required minimum) must be provided from available HQDA authorized or over-strength positions or personnel must be detailed for up to 24 months but assigned to existing ARSTAF agencies or MACOM.

(2) Upon disestablishment of the AMPS office, personnel will be returned to parent organizations or reassigned as appropriate.

g. Resource Summary (Manpower).

Manpower. Because of the temporary (2 yr) nature of the AMPS office it is unlikely that civilian positions could be filled except for the clerical positions. Manpower requirement is therefore:

OFF	12
EM	1
CIV	3

Inclosure 3

Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON

or

Command Over Functional RC Units

Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON

or

Command Over Functional RC Units

1. Problem - to determine the proper command and control relationship for selected RC units during peacetime, wartime, and the transition.

2. Facts bearing on the problem.

a. FORSCOM currently has command and control responsibility over all USAR units.

b. Command and control is exercised by CONUSA for FORSCOM.

c. HSC, TRADOC, DARCOM, USACC and MTMC provide command and control to TDA units upon mobilization.

d. CIDC and INSCOM provide command and control to a selected number of TOE deployable and non-deployable units upon mobilization.

e. USACC commands selected TOE RC units after they deploy.

f. Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions and Readiness Groups are charged with providing training assistance to all RC units.

g. All MACOM are presently assisting or initiating some type of assistance relationship with the RC units that they will command upon mobilization.

h. The USA Military Traffic Management Command has a formal training supervisory relationship with FORSCOM for selected units.

i. The Gaining Command Program (GCP) provides for identifying a tentative wartime assignment for early deploying Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units to the gaining USAREUR Corps or Communication Zone (COMMZ) Headquarters.

3. Discussion.

a. Since the STEADFAST reorganization most MACOM have assisted FORSCOM in providing training and support to the Reserve Components. Most of the programs have been informal, ranging from mutual support/parallel training to a modified Affiliating Program. When these programs were established, the MACOM were benefiting in some cases as much as the RC units, i.e., RC physicians were providing medical care in active military treatment facilities while receiving very little formalized military training.

b. These programs have been very beneficial to the AC and RC. However, they lack continuity, are cumbersome, loosely organized, responsibilities are not always clearly defined and the RC units are caught in the middle.

c. Recent exercises and evaluations have pointed out that the present structure does not provide the best means for an orderly and rapid transition to

war.

d. Weakness of Existing Structure.

(1) The present structure does not provide the MACOM with tasking authority.

(2) MACOM are required to coordinate through too many levels of command in order to communicate with a specific unit.

(3) The units are not closely aligned with their wartime MACOM.

(4) FORSCOM does not have the special interest in the TDA units that the MACOM have.

(5) Unclear and conflicting responsibilities for installation management during and subsequent to mobilization.

(6) Excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peace to war will occur.

(7) Prior to mobilization all MACOM are not provided with information pertinent to readiness status (strength and training) of RC units.

(8) All MACOM are not providing input to pre-mobilization readiness of units assigned to them upon mobilization.

e. Alternatives. There are two feasible alternatives to the existing structure.

(1) Alternative A: The MACOM exercise command and control of all RC units that report to the MACOM upon mobilization.

(2) Alternative B: The MACOM exercise limited operational control for mobilization planning and training supervision over the RC units that report to the MACOM upon mobilization (Definition of limited OPCON: Authorization for MACOM to assign tasks, designate objectives and provide direction necessary to accomplish the training and mobilization planning mission).

f. Evaluation of Alternatives.

(1) Alternative A. To improve the command and control posture of the Reserve Components is not a simple task. Only in those areas where an enhancement of training of the Total Force can be recognized should changes be considered. MACOM will receive upon mobilization a mix of National Guard and USAR deployable and non-deployable units. For these MACOM to exercise command and control over these select units during peacetime would create additional management problems and further split the command relationship within the Reserve Components and create a duplicative management structure. The single manager concept with the CONUSA dedicated to the RC management has proved successful with the exception of specialized training and mobilization planning for a select number of units. This present system provides for all of the administration and logistics required to manage the RC units and personnel. It would be a difficult task to reassign command functions from FORSCOM to various MACOM

by reassigning FORSCOM assets. Each MACOM would require a significant increase in personnel, logistical and fiscal resources.

(2) Alternative B. The primary objective of the limited OPCON relationship is for the MACOM to have a personal day-to-day relationship with the RC units that are assigned to them upon mobilization. A realistic MOU must be written and approved that would explain the relationship (See Incl 3 for example). MACOM should be able to exercise limited OPCON over the units with their existing staff and subordinate commands with a minor increase, if any, in personnel. Due to the different organizational structure and mission of each MACOM it is difficult at this time to determine the exact number of additional personnel required. The following additional personnel augmentation from the RC (statutory tours) should be adequate to assist the MACOM in establishing the program. HSC 1, TRADOC 3, and INSCOM 2. The following are the advantages and disadvantages of Alternative B.

(a) Advantages.

1 During peacetime all of the selected RC units would be aligned with their wartime chain of command with the MACOM providing immediate attention to mobilization and insuring a rapid and orderly wartime transition.

2 Technical training matters for the RC units will be promoted by a direct technical channel.

3 Concentrates training towards accomplishment of the post-mobilization mission through direct interface with mobilization activity.

4 Promotes standardization of operations with the RC units assigned to the MACOM.

5 Provides a direct channel of communications for updating of personnel, training, logistical and readiness matters.

6 Provides the RC force direct access to a broader special staff expertise.

7 Will not require a new headquarters or addition to Army end strength.

8 No structure changes required to manage RC units during IDT or AT.

9 Reduce FORSCOM responsibility for day-to-day operations in the limited OPCON area.

(b) Disadvantages.

1 Coordination of annual training scheduling may become somewhat more complex with more than one MACOM involved in communications.

2 CONUSA (if utilized as managers) would be responsive to two commands, FORSCOM for most units and to MACOM for the OPCON units.

3 Limited OPCON is difficult to define, therefore to be effective specific responsibilities must be agreed upon by FORSCOM and the other MACOM.

4 Extensive, time-consuming coordination would be required to insure that each headquarters is kept informed of actions which could impact on OPCON areas of responsibilities.

4. Conclusions.

a. Alternative A is not practical for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 3f(1).

b. Alternative B presents the best course of action because the advantages, which will create a closer relationship between the MACOM and RC units, far outweigh the aforementioned disadvantages.

c. In addition to the command and control problem that is being addressed, there is a problem associated with mobilization planning for a select number of late deploying units. (In one MACOM's situation early deploying units are, also considered). Most MACOM require these units to temporarily augment the CONUS base until the MACOM mobilization expansion plans are activated and all of the personnel positions are filled. One MACOM (DARCOM) will address this matter with FORSCOM and DA DCSOPS. This situation will require DA to consider altering the "Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL)".

5. Recommendations.

a. HQDA issue guidance placing the units listed on pages 3-6 through 3-12 under the limited OPCON of the MACOM indicated.

b. FORSCOM and the MACOM listed prepare a recommended MOU in the format as shown in the attachment that spells out in detail the limited OPCON relationship.

c. The MACOM listed be authorized to requisition additional personnel. The staffing should be from Reserve Component statutory tours (Section 265) personnel with the following breakdown:

USA Health Services Command	1
USA Training and Doctrine Command	3
USA Intelligence Command	2

d. MACOM with a requirement for temporary use of late deploying units to support the CONUS base, coordinate requirements with DA and FORSCOM.

6. The limited OPCON relationship should be an expansion of the Gaining Command Program (GCP) cited to in paragraph 2i above, and should compliment FORSCOM's CAPSTONE Program.

7. References.

US Army Forces Command
Command and Control of USAR Schools Study
Ft. McPherson: 19 March 1979.

US Army Forces Command
FORSCOM Regulation 3502:

Reserve Component (US Army) Training
Appendix O, Ft McPherson: 1 February 1979.

US Army Forces Command
USAR Training Division/Separate Training Brigade
Command and Control Study
Ft. McPherson: 24 March 1979.

US Army Health Services Command
Army Command and Control Study-82 (U)
HSC Response to ACCS-82 Tasking
Ft Sam Houston: 23 February 1979 (CONFIDENTIAL).

US Army, Training and Doctrinal Command
Army Command and Control Study-82
HQDA Letter 525-79-4
(DAMO-ODM) Subject: Gaining Command Program (GCP)
2 April 1979.

NON-DEPLOYING
RC UNITS
OPCON (POTENTIAL)
TO OTHER MACOM

HSC

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>
US Army	US Army	US Army	US Army
Hosp	Hosp	Hosp	Den Svc
(100B)	(Aug)	(Aug)	Det
	(300B)	(1000B)	(65-Man)
135			
147	3271	4005	1204
1207		4010	3346
2289	US Army	5502	
3343	Hosp		US Army
	(Aug)	US Army	Den Svc
US Army	(300B)	Den Svc	Det
Hosp		Det	(82-Man)
(300B)	3273		
	3344	(16-Man)	6355
5503		1205	
	US Army	1206	US Army
US Army	Hosp	3342	Den Svc
Hosp	(Aug)	5505	Det
(500B)	(500B)		(123-Man)
		US Army	
5010	6250	Den Svc	3299
		Det	
US Army	US Army	(21-Man)	US Army
Hosp	Hosp		Med TC
(750B)	(Aug)	5504	
	(750B)	5507	3457
6252		6254	
	1208		
US Army		US Army	
Hosp	US Army	Den Svc	
(1000B)	Hosp	Det	
	(Aug)	(31-Man)	
2290	(750B)		
		3295	
US Army	3270	2287	
Hosp	6251	2288	
(1000B)			
	US Army	US Army	
2291	Hosp	Den Svc	
3297	(Aug)	Det	
5501	(1000B)	(48-Man)	
6253			
	1125	3298	
	3274	4005	
	3345	5606	

TRADOC

Training Divisions

70th 91st
76th 95th
78th 98th
80th 100th
84th 104th
85th 108th

Reception Stations

3398th 3358th
407th 2053rd
5089th 6218th
3396th 6219th
1018th 4073rd
509st

Training Brigades

8830th MP Bde (AIT)
5th AR Bde (AIT)

USAR Schools

4151 USAR Sch - TX
4152 USAR Sch - LA
4153 USAR Sch - NM
4154 USAR Sch - AR
4155 USAR Sch - OK
4156 USAR Sch - OK
4157 USAR Sch - LA
4158 USAR Sch - LA
4159 USAR Sch - TX
4160 USAR Sch - IN
4161 USAR Sch - TX
4162 USAR Sch - TX
4164 USAR Sch - TX
4166 USAR Sch - TX
4960 USAR Sch - HI
5030 USAR Sch - IN
5032 USAR Sch - MI
5033 USAR Sch - MI
5034 USAR Sch - IL
5035 USAR Sch - IL
5038 USAR Sch - MO
5039 USAR Sch - MO
5040 USAR Sch - IA
5041 USAR Sch - IA
5042 USAR Sch - MN
5043 USAR Sch - SD
5045 USAR Sch - WI
5046 USAR Sch - CO
5047 USAR Sch - KS
5048 USAR Sch - KS

5049 USAR Sch - NE
6220 USAR Sch - CA
6222 USAR Sch - CA
6224 USAR Sch - AZ
6227 USAR Sch - CA
6228 USAR Sch - ID
6229 USAR Sch - WA
6232 USAR Sch - VT
6236 USAR Sch - WA
6237 USAR Sch - CA
6241 USAR Sch - WA
1031 USAR Sch - CT
1033 USAR Sch - ME
1034 USAR Sch - NH
1035 USAR Sch - VT
1036 USAR Sch - PA
1037 USAR Sch - MA
1049 USAR Sch - MA
1150 USAR Sch - NY
1151 USAR Sch - NY
1154 USAR Sch - NY
1155 USAR Sch - NJ
1157 USAR Sch - NY
1159 USAR Sch - NY
1163 USAR Sch - NY
2059 USAR Sch - PA
2070 USAR Sch - VA
2071 USAR Sch - MD
2072 USAR Sch - PA
2073 USAR Sch - PA

2074 USAR Sch - KY
2075 USAR Sch - OH
2076 USAR Sch - DE
2077 USAR Sch - OH
2078 USAR Sch - OH
2079 USAR Sch - VA
2085 USAR Sch - KY
2078 USAR Sch - OH
2090 USAR Sch - PA
2091 USAR Sch - PA
2093 USAR Sch - WV
2979 USAR Sch - VT
3283 USAR Sch - GA
3285 USAR Sch - NC
3286 USAR Sch - NC
3287 USAR Sch - SC
3288 USAR Sch - SC
3289 USAR Sch - SC
3290 USAR Sch - TN
3291 USAR Sch - TN
3292 USAR Sch - TN
3294 USAR Sch - GA
3385 USAR Sch - AL
3387 USAR Sch - FL
3388 USAR Sch - FL
3390 USAR Sch - MS
3391 USAR Sch - FL
3392 USAR Sch - AL

USACC

936th AV DET ATC
88th AV DET ATC
223rd AV DET ATC
49th AV DET ATC
150th AV DET ATC
11th AV DET ATC
47th AV DET ATC
426th AV DET ATC
28th AV DET ATC
670th AV DET ATC
253rd AV HQC
29th AB HHD BN
232nd AV DET ATC
145th AV PIT ATC
236st DET SIG CTR
2362nd DET SIG CTR
6201st RAD COM STA
6202nd RAD COM STA
6203rd RAD COM STA
6204th RAD COM STA
6205th RAD COM STA
6206th RAD COM STA
6207th RAD COM STA

MTMC

1188	MILITARY OCEAN TERM UNIT (81st ARCOM)	1172	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (94th ARCOM)
1175	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (79th ARCOM)	1192	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (122nd ARCOM)
1176	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (97th ARCOM)	1395	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (124th ARCOM)
1182	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (120th ARCOM)	1173	US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (94th ARCOM)
1159	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (94th ARCOM)	1185	US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (79th ARCOM)
1181	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (121st ARCOM)	1190	US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (122nd ARCOM)
1184	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (121st ARCOM)	1394	US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (63d ARCOM)
1191	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION (122nd ARCOM)	1397	US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (124th ARCOM)
1170	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (94th ARCOM)	US	ARMY PASSENGER LIAISON UNIT (120th ARCOM)
1174	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (77th ARCOM)	1179	DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT UNIT (77th ARCOM)
1186	US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (81st ARCOM)		

DARCOM

4-Aviation Classification and Repair Activities
(A select number of these units may deploy)

A - Groton, CT

B - Gulfport, MS

C - Springfield, MO

D - Fresno, CA

DEPLOYABLE AND NON DEPLOYABLE
RC UNITS
OPCON (POTENTIAL)
TO OTHER MACOM

CIDC

316th MP Det (CI)
321st MP Det (CI)
316th MP Det (CI)
321st MP Det (CI)
322nd MP Det (CI)
323rd MP Det (CI)
347th MP Det (CI)
348th MP Det (CI)
366th MP Det (CI)
375th MP Det (CI)
378th MP Det (CI)
380th MP Det (CI)
383rd MP Det (CI)
399th MP Det (CI)
425th MP Det (CI)
430th MP Det (CI)
493rd MP Det (CI)
733rd MP Det (CI)
ARNG 121st MP Det (CI)
170th MP Det (CI)
1156th MP Det (CI)
417th MP Det (CI)

INSCOM
TOE Deployable

308th MI DET
400th MI DET
401st MI DET
402nd MI DET
403rd MI DET
404th MI DET
405th MI DET
407th MI DET
408th MI DET
409th MI DET
411th MI DET
415th MI DET
416th MI DET
417th MI DET
419th MI DET
420th MI DET
421st MI DET
423rd MI DET
424th MI DET
425th MI DET
428th MI DET
432nd MI DET
433rd MI DET
434th MI DET
439th MI DET
440th MI DET
442nd MI DET
443rd MI DET
445th MI DET
446th MI DET
448th MI DET
449th MI DET
450th MI DET
453rd MI DET
454th MI DET
458th MI DET

462nd MI DET
468th MI DET
469th MI DET
470th MI DET
471th MI DET
474th MI DET
476th MI DET
477th MI DET
478th MI DET
479th MI DET
480th MI DET
481st MI DET
484th MI DET
486th MI DET
487th MI DET
488th MI DET
490th MI DET
698th MI DET
837th MI DET

MID (CI)

20th CI DET
226th CI DET
228th CI DET
283rd CI DET
337th CI DET
349th CI DET
372nd CI DET
826th MI Bn FLD Army
99th ASCO
197th AS Det
142nd MI CO
342nd ASCO

Example of OPCON Agreement
for
Training and Employment
of
Designated RC Units

1. Purpose. This directive provides guidance for MACOM exercising limited OPCON for mobilization planning and training supervision for designated Reserve Component (RC) units.

2. Applicability. This directive is applicable to designated TDA and TOE RC units. When this directive conflicts with the guidance of other regulations, circulars, and pamphlets, the provisions of this directive apply.

3. Explanation of Terms.

a. Designated Units. This term applies to all RC units designated for assignment to non-FORSCOM MACOM upon mobilization. Most of these units are organized by TDA and assigned to the USAR troop program.

b. MTMC. The Military Traffic Management Command is a jointly staffed industrially funded major Army command through which the Secretary of the Army executes his responsibility as Department of Defense (DOD) Single Manager for military traffic, land transportation and common user ocean terminals.

c. HSC. The Health Services Command provides health services for the Army in the Continental United States (CONUS), Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and, as directed by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA), for other departments, agencies, and organizations. It provides medical professional education and training for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and, as required or directed, of other Army personnel, members of other Services or federal agencies, and authorized foreign national personnel within policies established by HQDA.

d. TRADOC. The Training and Doctrine Command develops and manages training of individuals of the Army and authorized foreign nationals. It conducts all combat developments not assigned by HQDA to other commands and agencies and, as the Army's principal combat developer, guides, coordinates, and integrates the total combat development effort of the Army. TRADOC commands organizations and installations as assigned by HQDA and, through assigned installations, provides administrative, logistical, and other support services to elements and agencies of DA, DOD, and satellites of TRADOC installations.

e. DARCOM. The Material Development and Readiness Command acts as the primary materiel developer with responsibilities for research, development, configuration management, developmental test and evaluation, integrated logistics support planning and execution, acquisition or procurement production for new materiel systems for the US Army and other DOD agencies as assigned. It develops and provides materiel maintenance and related logistic services to DA and other agencies as directed, or in accordance with letters of agreement. DARCOM provides world-wide technical and professional guidance and assistance for readiness planning and logistic support for Army materiel in coordination with the US Army Logistics Center in its area of responsibility.

f. CIDC. The Criminal Investigation Command provides services to all US Army elements and, as directed by the Chief of Staff, Army, or higher authority, conducts sensitive or special interest investigations and provides or conducts protective service operations for DOD and DA.

g. INSCOM. The Intelligence and Security Command conducts intelligence, counter-intelligence and electronic weapons operations in support of the Army at echelons above corps. It conducts Signals Intelligence and commands the Army Component of the Central Security Service. INSCOM analyzes, produces and disseminates all source counter-intelligence and provides advice, assistance and technical operational support to ensure maximum exploitation of national intelligence assets.

h. USACC. Army Communications Command engineers, installs, operates and maintains the Army's communications systems at all echelons above the corps level including Army posts, camps and stations; the Army's air traffic control systems (both tactical and non-tactical) and the Army's assigned portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS).

i. Limited OPCON - Authorization for MACOM to assign tasks, designate objectives and provide direction necessary to accomplish the training and mobilization planning mission.

4. General. Designated Reserve Component units will conduct progressive military and functional training. Their objectives are to attain and maintain the highest levels of individual and unit proficiency that are achievable in a pre-mobilization status in order to produce units qualified to perform operational missions assigned by MACOM with the absolute minimum of postmobilization training.

5. Inactive Duty Training (IDT).

a. During IDT, units will emphasize mission-related training which can be accomplished at home station. Classroom instruction, command post exercises, SQT training, mutual support programs, and civilian-sponsored unit programs are examples of training that can be conducted during IDT to improve individual and unit readiness.

b. FORSCOM Reg 350-2 outlines general guidance for IDT. This guidance is amplified/modified as follows: TDA designated units are exempted from field environment and overnight bivouac requirements except when necessary to provide additional site support requirements.

c. CPX requirements indicated in FORSCOM Reg 350-2 do not apply to designated units. For these units, the following applies:

(1) Units which have attained a C-1 or C-2 training rating will conduct or participate in one mission oriented CPX annually.

(2) C-3 and C-4 units will concentrate on training which will improve their training rating and are exempted from CPX requirements until they progress to a C-2 rating.

6. Annual Training (AT).

a. Training conducted at AT should include training which cannot be conducted efficiently at home station. Designated units should train in an operational site environment so as to acquire experience in actual operations.

b. CONUSA provide training schedule site and dates in coordination with MACOM.

7. Field Training/Bivouacs. TDA designated units are not required to perform training in a field environment during IDT or AT because their missions do not require operation in such an environment; however, if only field conditions exist at a required training site, training will be conducted under those conditions.

8. Weapons Qualification. TDA designated units are not authorized weapons; however, individual weapon qualification/familiarization requirements for these units may be established by the CONUSA concerned, IAW guidance contained in Army regulations.

9. Familiarization Tours of Mobilization Sites. Designated units will conduct familiarization tours of mobilization sites. Units will normally conduct such tours during IDT. For those units unable to conduct such surveys during IDT, MACOM will attempt to conduct these tours during the unit's scheduled AT. Unit personnel to accomplish this requirement will be selected by the unit commander. All familiarization tour/site surveys will be coordinated by MACOM and arrangements made with installations in advance. These tours/surveys will be scheduled so that each unit will conduct surveys at least once every three years.

10. Individual School Training. Officer and enlisted personnel are encouraged to apply for appropriate career, functional, or MOS awarding courses. US Army Schools (DA Pam 351-4), correspondence courses (DA Pam 351-20), or nonresident USAR school courses are available. Personnel enrolled in correspondence courses that have combination resident and nonresident phases must request quotas for resident phases of training, through channels, to the respective CONUSA headquarters. Class dates for all resident courses are listed in TRADOC Pam 350-series. Officers should enroll in those courses which fulfill the military education requirements for promotion as outlined in AR 135-155.

11. Essential Functions of MACOM Operations. Training in essential functions such as MIS, documentation and contract administration, should be accomplished during both IDT and AT. Separation of personnel from a unit during IDT/AT should not be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the required training in these functions.

a. MIS Training.

(1) Mutual support agreements will be established, where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, to provide MIS training during IDT/AT.

(2) Two-week resident courses can be established at the US Army Administration Center, Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Specific instructions are provided in "d" below.

(3) Enrollment in MIS-oriented correspondence courses provided by the US

Army Administration Center is encouraged.

b. Documentation Training. (MTMC/DARCOM)

(1) Enrollment in correspondence courses provided by the US Army Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Virginia, is encouraged.

(2) Use of USAR schools with documentation instruction should be considered for IDT or AT.

(3) Mutual support agreements will be established, where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, which can provide OJT in the use of MILSTAMP procedures during IDT/AT.

(4) Two-week resident courses can be established at the US Army Transportation School. Specific instructions are provided in para "d" below.

c. Contract Administration Training (MTMC/DARCOM).

(1) Mutual support agreements will be established, where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, which can provide OJT in contract administration procedures.

(2) Attendance at the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, which provides resident courses in contract administration, is encouraged. Quotas for attendance are allocated by the US Army Logistics Management Center through the Commander, US Army Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM). Applications should be forwarded through channels to Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFPR-MPT-S.

d. Special resident instruction. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and service schools can provide two week courses for RC personnel. Requests for courses to be presented will be forwarded through channels to Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-RCO, at least six months prior to the desired start date. A minimum of 20 students per course is required. Since one unit may not be able to provide the minimum student load, CONUSA will consolidate command-wide requirements.

12. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for TOE units.

a. The purpose of the ARTEP for designated units is to establish standardization and uniformity among the units' training programs. The ARTEP provide a basis for development of training objectives by specifying minimum standards of performance for critical missions and tasks. They also provide the unit commander a means of evaluating the effectiveness of past training of all echelons of his unit, as well as assessing future training needs.

b. Unit evaluation, using the ARTEP, will be in accordance with FORSCOM Reg 350-2.

c. MACOM personnel will conduct the external ARTEP evaluations, and provide qualified evaluations (including the Site Chief Evaluator).

13. Coordination.

a. Direct technical communication channels between MACOM and the designated units is authorized. Communications that are directive in nature will be channeled through Commander, FORSCOM, the appropriate CONUSA, and the RC chain of command.

b. CONUSA are authorized to coordinate directly with MACOM concerning AT scheduling and evaluation of the designated Reserve Component units, and for the use of MACOM installations during IDT/AT.

14. The command relationships outlined in this draft Memorandum of Understanding will accommodate the philosophy of the Army's CAPSTONE program which in turn, implements the Gaining Command Program.

Inclosure 4

Mobilization Planners - Assignment

By Installation

Table 4-1
Mobilization Planners-Assignment by Installation

	<u>Number Allocated</u>
<u>1.</u> Health Services Command	
Fitzsimons AMC	0
Walter Reed AMC	1
<u>2.</u> Army Communications Command	
Ft Huachuca	1
<u>3.</u> Army Materiel Development & Readiness Command	
Aberdeen Proving Ground	1
Ft Monmouth	1
Redstone Arsenal	1
Tobyhanna Army Depot	0
<u>4.</u> Training and Doctrine Command	
Ft Benning	2
Ft Bliss	2
Ft Belvoir	1
Ft Chaffee	1
Ft Dix	2
Ft Eustis	1 Responsible for Ft Story
Ft Gordon	2
Ft Harrison	2
Ft Hill	1
Ft Jackson	2
Ft Knox	2
Ft Leonard Wood	2
Ft Lee	2
Ft McClellan	1
Ft Pickett	1
Ft Rucker	1
Ft Sill	2
<u>5.</u> Forces Command	
Ft Bragg	2
Ft Campbell	2
Ft Carson	2
Ft Hood	2
Ft Drum	2
Ft Devens	2 Responsible for Camp Edwards
Ft Indiantown Gap	2
Ft Lewis	2
Ft McCoy	2 Responsible for Camp Ripley
Ft Meade	1
Ft Ord	3 Responsible for Camp Roberts/Ft Irwin
Ft Polk	3 Responsible for Camp Shelby

Ft Riley	2	
Ft Sheridan	2	Responsible for
		Camp Grayling
Ft Stewart	2	
Presidio of San Francisco	<u>1</u>	
	TOTAL REQUIRED	64

Inclosure 5

Post-mobilization Assignment of ARCOM
to Command Mobilization Stations

Table 5-1.
Post-mobilization Assignment of ARCOM to Command Mobilization Stations.

<u>MOB STATION</u>	<u>ARCOM</u>	<u>HOME STATION</u>
Devens	94	Bedford, MA
Drum	77	Flushing, NY
FIG	79	Willow Grove, PA
AP. Hill	97	Ft Meade, MD
Pickett	99	Oakdale, PA
Bragg	120	Ft Jackson, SC
Stewart	81	East Point, GA
Shelby	121	Birmingham, AL
McCoy	86	Arlington Hts, IL
Ripley	88	Ft Snelling, MN
Chaffee	102	St Louis, MO
Campbell	83	Columbus, OH
Grayling	123	Indianapolis, IN
Hood	90	San Antonio, TX
Polk	122	Little Rock, AR
Carson	96	Ft Douglas, UT
Riley	89	Wichita, KS
Ord	63	Los Angeles, CA
Lewis	124	Ft Lawton, WA

Inclosure 6

CONUSA TDA

CONUSA TDA

(Published Separately)

Inclosure 7

Manpower for Recommended Added

Corps HHC Organization

Table 7-1. Manpower For
Recommended Added Corps HHC Organization

PARA	DESCRIPTION	TOE 52-002H4				MTOE			
		OFF	WO	ENL	AGG	OFF	WO	ENL	AGG
101	COMD SEC	4	-	10	14	4	-	6	10
102	CHIEF OF STF SEC	9	1	5	15	4	1	3	8
103	G-1 SEC	7	-	10	17	5	-	7	12
104	G-2 SEC	20	-	23	43	18	-	22	30
105	G-3 SEC	31	-	35	66	24	-	25	47
106	G-4 SEC	10	-	17	27	8	-	12	20
107	G-5 SEC	5	-	4	9	4	-	3	7
108	AG SEC	8	-	12	20	8	-	10	18
109	CH SEC	4	-	5	9	4	-	4	8
110	C-E SEC	9	1	10	20	8	1	6	14
111	HQ CMDT	2	-	4	6	2	-	3	5
112	INFO SEC	2	-	4	6	2	-	3	5
113	IG SEC	3	-	5	8	3	-	4	7
114	RR/EO SEC	4	-	5	9	4	-	5	9
115	SJA SEC	10	1	6	16	8	1	5	14
116	SURG SEC	5	-	5	10	4	-	4	8
118	ENGR SEC	-	-	-	1	9	-	7	16
118	ENGR SEC	-	-	-	1	9	-	7	16
119	FLD ARTY SEC	-	-	-	47	6	-	4	10
120	PM SEC	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
121	CO HQ	2	-	4	7	2	-	3	5
122	FOOD SVC SEC	-	1	10	11	-	1	10	11
123	MAINT SEC	-	-	7	7	-	-	7	7
124	SPLY SEC	-	1	6	7	-	1	4	5
125	COSCOM SEC	-	-	-	-	11	-	8	19
126	CONTGCY PL SEC	-	-	-	-	10	-	9	19
TOTAL		135	5	186	326	153	6	171	329

Inclosure 8

AC COSCOM Detachment

Table 8-1. AC COSCOM Detachment

<u>Para</u>	<u>Line</u>		<u>Strength</u>			<u>MOS</u>
			<u>GR</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>EM</u>	
110	1	Chief of COSCOM Det	0-6	1		70A00
	2	Chief Supply Sgt	E-9		1	76K50
	3	Secretary-Steno	E-5		1	71C20
	4	Liaison Officer	0-5	1		93A53
	5	Ass't Services Officer	0-4	1		93A00
	6	Engineer Staff Officer	0-4	1		21C00
	7	Dep AC of S Mat. Mgt	0-5	1		92A00
	8	Maint Plans-Op Officer	0-5	1		91A00
	11	ACFT Maint. Officer	0-3	1		71A00
	10	Clerk Typist	E-4		1	71L10
	11	ACFT Maint. Officer	0-3	1		71A00
	12	Armament Maint. Sgt	E-8		1	63K50
	13	Maint. Officer	0-3	1		91A53
	14	Petrl Supply Sgt	E-8		1	76W50
	15	Trans. Hwy Plans Officer	0-4	1		88A00
	16	Movement Supervisor	E-7		1	71N40
	17	Clerk Typist	E-4		1	71L10
	18	Ass't Plans-Op Officer	0-4	1		91X54
	19	Chief Scty Op Sgt	E-8		1	96B50
			<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>		
			Total Strength 19			

Inclosure 9

Corps Field Artillery Section (FAS)

Table 9-1. Corps
Field Artillery Section (FAS)


			<u>STRENGTH</u>	
	<u>GR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
19-02 Deputy FA Officer	0-6	13A00	1	
19-03 Ass't FS Coordinator	0-5	13A00	1	
19-04 FA Intelligence Officer	0-4	13A35		
19-07 Tgt. ACQ Staff Officer	0-4	13D35	1	
19-11 Tgt Analyst	0-3	13A00	2	
19-13 Ass't Op Sergeant	E-8	13Y50		1
19-23 Operations Specialist	E-4	13E20		1
19-24 TA/ Intelligence Specialist	E-5	17C20		1
19-26 Clerk Typist	E-4	71L10		1
			<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>
			TOTAL 10	

INCLOSURE 10

Proposed Organization of Corps

Signal Brigade

Figure 10-1.
Proposed Organization of Corps Signal Brigade



Corps Command Operation Battalion

1. Mission.

Provide organic aircraft in support of a signal brigade and terminal communications facilities (message center, teletypewriter, telephone, facsimile, and air and motor messenger service) for the echelons of the corps headquarters.

2. Capabilities.

At full strength, the Corps Command Operations battalion provides the following:


- a. A communications complex to support the corps main CP.
- b. A communications complex to support the corps tactical operations center (CTOC).
- c. A communications complex (CNCE) to support COSCOM/rear.
- d. Installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities at the materiel management center (MMC).
- e. Installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities at the corps TAC CP.
- f. Organic aircraft to support the Corps Signal Brigade.
- g. Four secure FM aerial retransmission stations.
- h. Organizational maintenance of organic equipment.
- j. DS level maintenance of C-E and COMSEC equipment of the HHC Corps Signal Brigade (TOE 11-402).

3. Limitations.

The Corps Command Operations Battalion is dependent upon:

- a. The Corps Signal Brigade for CSCE functions and coordination and guidance for CSCE operations.
- b. The Corps aviation group for the supplemental aircraft required for two secure FM aerial retransmission stations.
- c. Appropriate units serving the area for personnel, medical, and finance services; supplemental transportation; and direct support maintenance of organic aircraft.

Figure 10-2. Corps Command Operations Battalion.



Corps Radio Battalion

1. Mission.

a. Provide echelons of a corps headquarters and designated major subordinate units with a command multichannel system and with RATT stations for operation in corps radio nets.

b. Provide RWI stations for FM voice access to the corps telephone system.

2. Capabilities.

At full strength, the Corps Radio Battalion provides the following:

a. Troposcatter multichannel systems between the corps main CP and five division designated headquarters.

b. Troposcatter multichannel terminal facilities at the corps main CP to terminate a link to an adjacent corps.

c. Multichannel line-of-sight (LOS) systems to interconnect corps HQ, corps TAC CP, COSCOM/rear, five division (main) HQ, separate brigade, armored cavalry regiment, three designated major subordinate units and the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

d. Multichannel LOS repeaters to extend the range of corps multichannel systems.

e. RATT stations for operation in the following corps nets or for employment as required:

(1) Six stations at the corps main CP for operation in five corps command nets and the corps ground liaison net.

(2) One station at the corps TAC CP for operation in one of the command nets.

(3) Two stations to establish a net with an adjacent corps.

(4) Five stations for operation in the corps ground liaison net, four located at corps airfields and one located at the TACC to support the battle coordination element (BCE).

(5) Fourteen stations at designated major subordinate commands for operation in the five corps command nets.

(6) One station located at a missile HQ for operation in a corps command net.

(7) Two stations to establish an artillery liaison net.

(8) Two stations which function as NCS for two artillery nets: the corps artillery fire net and the corps artillery command/fire net.

f. Direct support level maintenance of battalion C-E and COMSEC equipment.

g. RWI stations at the corps main CP, corps TAC CP, and COSCOM/rear for FM access to the corps telephone system.

h. Organizational maintenance for small arms, vehicles, generator sets, air conditioners, and C-E equipment.

3. Limitations.

The Corps Radio Battalion is dependent upon:

a. The Corps Signal Brigade CSCE for system and circuit allocation/priorities and frequency allocation information.


b. The Corps Command Operations Battalion for aircraft support to provide command and control, staff supervision, aerial reconnaissance, and logistical support of battalion operations.

c. Appropriate elements of the corps for personnel administration, finance services, medical services, and transportation support.

4. Basis of Allocation.

One per Corps Signal Brigade.

Figure 10-3. Corps Radio Battalion



Inclosure 11

Candidate Stations for Added

AC Corps HQ

Table 11-1. CANDIDATE STATIONS FOR ADDED AC CORPS HQ.

STATION	CIV LINES OF COMM	ADMIN FAC	BIL AND F. HSG	COM REL	STRAT MOB FAC	
					AIR Y	RAIL Y
FT LEWIS	GOOD	AVAIL	AVAIL	GOOD	Y	Y
FT SHERIDAN	GOOD	RQR CONV	AVAIL	GOOD	Y	Y
FT ORD	FAIR	RQR CONV	POOR	GOOD	Y	Y
PRESIDIO OF SF	GOOD	AVAIL	POOR	GOOD	Y	Y
FT CARSON	FAIR	NOT AVAIL	POOR	GOOD	Y	Y
FT RILEY	POOR	NOT AVAIL	POOR	GOOD	N	Y

END

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